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Abstract
Selective attention is an amalgamation of processing systems geared to select different
classes of information to optimise the agent’s transaction with the environment.
Emerging evidence suggests that three forms of selective attention are engaged by
conditioned stimuli, depending upon the arousal, valence and uncertainty of the
predicted outcome. To support this claim, we review a series of human discrimination
learning procedures in which we recorded gaze position with an eye tracker. The results
suggest that conditioned stimuli command efficient detection to the extent that they
predict an arousing outcome (appetitive or aversive), which may be important for action
selection. By contrast, attention is subsequently maintained on conditioned stimuli to the
extent that they predict an appetitive outcome specifically, which may be important for
affective state. Finally, attention is also maintained to conditioned stimuli that have an
uncertain relationship with an outcome, irrespective of whether that outcome is aversive
or neutral, which may be important for contingency learning. We describe these three
systems as looking-for-action, looking-for-liking and looking-for-learning, respectively.
The discussion focuses on how one might further isolate these three attentional systems
and explore their differential role in action selection, affective state and learning. Finally,
our studies are considered in the light of contemporary behavioural neuroscience to
contribute to the translational neuropsychological theory of attention.
Introduction
Selective attention is an amalgamation of processing systems geared to select different
classes of information to optimise the agent’s transaction with the environment. Within
selective attention, sub-systems can be distinguished that select different types of
stimuli. The clearest example of this can be found in perceptual psychophysics, where it
has been demonstrated that a variety of “low level” attributes of stimuli, such as colour,
motion, orientation, size, etc. all drive selective attention (Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004) via
at least partially segregated neural substrates (Knudsen, 2007, Yantis, 2008). The claim
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made in this chapter is that the “higher level” attributes of stimuli acquired during
associative learning are similarly selected for privileged processing within at least three
distinct attentional systems, which appear to have partially segregated neural
substrates.
Three forms of selective attention in associative learning
The idea that selective attention can be modulated by the predictive significance of
stimuli has a long tradition in associative learning theory. The original theory put forward
by Mackintosh (1975; see also Sutherland and Mackintosh, 1971) argued that animals
attend preferentially to cues that are relatively good predictors of other events of
biological importance (outcomes) such as food and water, and thereby learn more
readily about relationships involving these cues. Therefore, through this attentional
process the predictive history of a stimulus can inform new learning.
Subsequently, Pearce and Hall (1980) claimed that, rather than attending to reliable
predictors, animals in fact attend most to stimuli that have been associated with
uncertainty so that learning is directed to those stimuli for which the animal does not
possess an adequate predictive mental model. According to this theory, the occurrence
of an unpredicted outcome, or the absence of a predicted one, evokes a prediction error
signal (surprise), which indicates that the animal does not have an adequate
representation of the predictive structure of its environment and therefore needs to
undertake further learning. Consequently, the animal should, in future, attend to cues
that are associated with the prediction error signal in order that the animal might acquire
veridical knowledge of the predictive significance of those stimuli, and so by degrees,
acquire a veridical representation of the predictive structure of the environment. Once
prediction is accurate, so that important outcomes can be anticipated and no error signal
is evoked, there is no need to devote further learning resources to these stimuli, and
attention to them declines.
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The Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall theories therefore make opposing predictions concerning
attention for conditioned stimuli. Mackintosh’s theory suggests that attention will
increase with the reliability of the predictive contingency between the stimulus and the
outcome, whereas Pearce and Hall predict that attention will increase with the
unreliability of the predictive contingency between the stimulus and the outcome. It is
perhaps not surprising, given these opposing predictions, that much of the debate
addressing these two theories has adopted an oppositional stance, where each camp has
mustered evidence in favour of one or other position. However, a unified account was
potentially embedded within Pearce and Hall’s (1980) original formulation.
This unified account claims that there are two forms of attention in associative learning:
one concerned with prediction and action, and one concerned with uncertainty and
learning. More precisely, Pearce and Hall claimed that a reliable predictor commands an
“automatic” form of attentional selection, which might today be variously labelled as
fast, efficient, covert or pre-attentive, but which ultimately functions to detect predictive
stimuli with maximum cognitive economy to enable rapid action selection. This automatic
form of attentional selection increases with the strength of the predictive relationship
between the stimulus and the outcome, and is principally involved in behavioural control.
By contrast, unreliable predictive stimuli command a second form of “controlled”
attentional selection, which may be operationalised as the maintenance of sensory focus
upon the stimulus, or the holding of the stimulus in working memory (see Belopolsky
and Theeuwes, 2009), which facilitates the formation of knowledge about the
contingency between that stimulus and subsequent outcomes. This controlled form of
attentional selection increases with the unreliability of the contingency between the
stimulus and the outcome, and is principally involved in contingency learning. Our
attentional data reviewed below tend to favour this sort of multiple systems account of
selective attention in associative learning.
While the Mackintosh vs. Pearce-Hall debate raged in the arena of associative learning, a
tangential discussion was developing elsewhere concerning the link between attention
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and emotion (Vuilleumier, 2005, Vuilleumier et al., 2003). The disconnection between
these two debates is unwarranted, however, because whenever cues have a predictive
relationship with a biologically relevant outcome, they acquire affective value in their
own right. Consequently, attention for predictive cues should not only vary in accordance
with their associative strength and prediction error, but also, in accordance with the
biological value of their associated outcome.
Research addressing the link between attention and emotion has focused to a large
extent on the issue of whether attention is controlled by the arousing properties of a
stimulus, or its valence. The arousal dimension is considered to range from neutral to
arousing (i.e. a scale from 0–1), where both appetitive and aversive cues are arousing.
By contrast, the valence dimension is thought to range from appetitive at one end to
aversive at the other (i.e. a scale from -1 – 0 - 1), reflecting the hedonic or affective
sign of the stimulus.
Research addressing the link between attention and emotion favours the view that the
early form of attentional selection equating to Pearce and Hall’s automatic process is
commanded in accordance with the arousing qualities of stimuli, irrespective of their
valence (Brosch et al., 2008, Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007, Lin and Nicolelis, 2008,
Livesey et al., 2009, Vogt et al., 2008, Lewis et al., 2007; but see; Fox et al., 2001,
Eastwood et al., 2001). Such early detection may accord with arousal, rather than
valence, because it plays a critical role in the initiation of both approach and avoidance
behaviour.
By contrast, following initial detection, the maintenance/avoidance of attention appears
to respect the valence of the stimulus. For instance, cues associated with larger
quantities of food command more attentional orienting in animals (Morris and Bouton,
2006), and increasing the incentive value of food (Mogg et al., 1998) and drugs of abuse
(Field et al., 2004) by enforcing deprivation from these resources increases the
maintenance of attention for cues associated with these resources. Finally, induction of
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positive mood and individual differences in positive mood state are associated with
enhanced attention to reward-related cues (Tamir and Robinson, 2007).
By contrast, aversive cues command attentional avoidance following initial detection, if
they are sufficiently aversive (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005, Weierich et al., 2008). Such
attentional avoidance of aversive cues is associated with individual differences in
anxiety/negative mood and exposure to stress (Beevers and Carver, 2003, Calvo and
Avero, 2005, Calvo and Eysenck, 2000, Frewen et al., 2008, Koster et al., 2005,
Morrison and O'Connor, 2008), and is thought to play a role in regulating affective state
(MacLeod et al., 2002).
To reconcile the fields of attention in associative learning and emotion, we propose the
existence of three attentional systems, as summarised in Figure 1. The left column of
Figure 1 outlines the prediction + arousal system, which equates to Pearce and Hall’s
automatic detection process. This framework proposes that preferential early detection
of a stimulus is jointly determined by the associative strength of the stimulus (that is,
the extent to which it predicts an outcome) and the arousal value of the predicted
outcome (that is, the biological importance of the outcome irrespective of whether it is
appetitive or aversive). Accordingly, the left column shows early detection increasing for
stimuli to the extent that they predict an appetitive or aversive outcome, but not for
stimuli that predict a neutral outcome. We think that such early detection is most
important for action selection. By contrast, the prediction + valence system, outlined in
the middle column of Figure 1, proposes that the subsequent maintenance or avoidance
of attention to a stimulus is determined jointly by the associative strength of the
stimulus and the appetitive/aversive valence of the outcome, which approximates the
expected utility of the outcome 1 (see; Rangel et al., 2008). Accordingly, the middle
1 In the language of decision making, we claim that attentional maintenance/avoidance
is determined by the utility of the outcome expectancy evoked by the CS, where utility is
the sum of the biological value of the expected outcomes weighted by their probabilities
(Rangel et al., 2008).
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column shows attention being maintained to cues to the extent that they predict an
appetitive outcome, avoiding cues to the extent that they predict an aversive outcome,
and being unbiased for cues that predict a neutral outcome. This system may be most
important for regulating affective state. Finally, the right column of Figure 1 outlines the
uncertainty system, which equates to Pearce and Hall’s controlled process. According to
this framework, attention is also maintained to a stimulus to the extent that it conveys
uncertainty about the probability of an outcome (prediction error), irrespective of
whether the outcome is arousing (appetitive/aversive) or neutral. Accordingly, the right
column shows attentional maintenance being maximal for cues with unreliable predictive
relationships, compared to cues with reliable predictive or reliable non-predictive
relationships, irrespective of whether the outcome is appetitive, aversive or neutral. We
think this uncertainty system is most important for learning. Finally, we believe that
these three attentional systems operate concurrently, such that experimental
measurement of attentional selection to some extent conflates all three. The next section
outlines human discrimination learning schedules undertaken in our lab, which have
served to behaviourally isolate these three attentional systems, to some extent.
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Figure 1: Descriptive predictions concerning the detection and maintenance of attention to conditioned stimuli
after asymptotic learning. The nine stimuli outlined differ with respect to their contingency with an outcome (no
contingency -, partial contingency +/-, and full positive contingency +), and the biological value of that outcome
(appetitive, neutral, aversive). Three attentional systems are proposed, which jointly govern attention to
conditioned stimuli. 1. The prediction + arousal system, outlined in the left column, quickly detects stimuli to the
extent that they predict arousing outcomes, which may be important for action selection. 2. The prediction +
valence system, outlined in the middle column, determines the subsequent maintenance/avoidance of attention to
stimuli to the extent that they predict appetitive or aversive outcomes, respectively, which may be important for
regulating affective state. 3. The uncertainty system also determines the maintenance of attention to stimuli, but
in accordance with the uncertainty the stimulus conveys about future outcomes (irrespective of the outcomes’
arousing properties). This form of attention may be important for contingency learning. The actual observed
attentional selection of conditioned stimuli should conflate these three systems, making it difficult to untangle
their relative contribution behaviourally. The studies presented in this chapter have assessed only some of these 9
conditions, but overall, this work supports the existence of these three attentional systems.
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Looking-for-action versus looking-for-liking
Our program of research reviewed here was originally inspired by Robinson and
Berridge's (1993) incentive salience theory of addiction. This theory proposes that
stimuli that are associated with addictive drugs command excessive attention, which
mediates the compulsive, under-controlled nature of drug seeking. In developing this
account, Robinson and Berridge (1993) initially favoured a Pavlovian sign-tracking
process (Bindra, 1978) through which drug stimuli control a strong approach response,
but subsequently, their work has recognised that drug cues might also control drug
seeking through the well-established motivational impact of reward-predicting stimuli on
instrumental performance (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000, Wyvell and Berridge, 2001).
To test Robinson and Berridge's (1993) proposal in humans, we established an arbitrary
stimulus as a signal for when a drug seeking response would be rewarded, so that we
could measure the acquisition of an attentional bias for the stimulus and relate this
attentional bias to the subjective expectancy of drug reward and the probability of
performing the drug seeking response. According to Robinson and Berridge (1993), there
should be a close mapping between these measures, consistent with the role of the
attentional bias in behavioural control. However, the procedure can also address
Mackintosh’s and Pearce-Hall’s theories of attention insomuch as Mackintosh, like
Robinson and Berridge (1993), predicts that attention to the predictive stimulus should
monotonically increase with training, whereas Pearce-Hall anticipates most attention
during learning of the stimulus-outcome contingencies, when uncertainty is greatest.
The details of the discrimination procedure are outlined in Figure 2. To measure the
selectivity of attention, we employed the relative validity schedule developed by Wagner
and colleagues, AX+, BX-, which allows two stimuli to be presented concurrently during
training, with one cue signalling the availability (A) or unavailability (B) of reward in that
trial, and the concurrently presented stimulus (X) being redundant (less informative)
with respect to the trial outcome, therefore constituting a contextual or background
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stimulus (Wagner, 1969, Wagner et al., 1968). We simply added a second contextual
cue (Y) to create the schedule AX+, AY+, BX-, BY-, to match the absolute number of
times all stimuli were presented, allowing us to assess attention to the informative cues
A and B relative to the common contextual cues, X and Y.
The pooled results from five replications of the procedure are presented in Figure 3
(Hogarth et al., 2006b, Hogarth et al., 2008b, Hogarth et al., 2007, Hogarth et al.,
2009). The most striking aspect of these data was that conditioned effects across the
different measures were selective to participants who became aware of the stimulus-
outcome contingencies, and so only data from this group are included in Figure 3
(awareness was classified by the participants showing a significant difference in reward
expectancies between A+ and B- trials in the final block of training). This finding is
consistent with the view that human conditioning is mediated by outcome expectancy
(Hogarth et al., 2007, Hogarth and Duka, 2006, Lovibond and Shanks, 2002) rather than
by an associative architecture outside awareness (Lieberman et al., 1998a, Lieberman et
al., 1998b, Perruchet, 1985, Perruchet et al., 2006). Moreover, visual inspection of the
expectancy reports of individual participants revealed a sudden differentiation between
A+ and B- trials, occurring at some point in training, suggestive of sudden rule based
learning.
To determine what rules aware participants had learned, we showed them a picture of
the four stimuli (see Figure 2) and asked them the question, “How did you decide when
to press the space bar?”. Some participants reported that they knew that stimulus A
predicted a win and so pressed when they saw this stimulus, and that otherwise they
knew that they would lose and so withheld pressing in this situation. Therefore, this
group appeared to learn the identity and predictive significance of stimulus A, but not of
the remaining three stimuli, and treated the absence of stimulus A as the S- condition.
By contrast, other participants reporting that they knew that stimulus B predicted loss,
and that they withheld responding when they saw this stimulus, and otherwise that they
knew that they would win and so pressed in this situation. Therefore, this group
Page 11 23/11/2009
11
appeared to learn the identity of stimulus B, but not of the remaining three stimuli, and
treated the absence of stimulus B as the S+ condition. Finally, some participants
reported knowing that stimulus A predicted a win whereas stimulus B predicted a loss,
and so pressed and withheld the response when they saw these two stimuli,
respectively. Therefore, this group appeared to learn the identity of both stimulus A and
B. We have grouped participants in Figure 3 on the basis of which of these three rules
they reported, to examine their differential allocation of selective attention to the stimuli.
One may wonder what differentiates participants who learned these three types of rule.
The first thing to note, in this regard, is the uneven number of participants in each group
(Figure 3, which was significant by Chi square). The smallest number of participants,
who learned A&B, might be expected on the grounds of cognitive economy – why should
participants explore the alternative rule when the one they are using enables asymptotic
discrimination performance? The learning of the A=win vs. B=lose rules, by contrast,
might have been thought a matter of chance, depending upon which was detected first.
However, the uneven split between these two groups instead suggests a preference for
learning the A=win rule. This preference is perhaps due to the phrasing of the
expectancy question “how likely are you to win ¼ of a cigarette” at point E in the trial
sequence (see Figure 2), which effectively prompts acquisition of the A=win rule.
However, it is also possible that differential learning of these two rules is founded upon a
biological trait (Frank et al., 2004), but this remains to be verified.
Our concern here, however, is with the differential allocation of selective attention to
stimuli depending upon which rule was learned. First of all, it should be noted that the
three groups were indistinguishable with respect to the acquisition of differential reward
expectancies and instrumental discrimination between A+ and B- trials. Yet the
attentional performance of the three groups differed markedly. Analysis of the dwell time
data shown in Figure 3 indicated that A-learners attended more to A than the contextual
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cues X/Y(A), but not to B relative to X/Y(B). By contrast, B-learners attended more to B
than X/Y(B), but not more to A than X/Y(A)2. Finally, A&B-learners showed the same
pattern of attentional bias as A-learners, except their difference between A and X/Y(A)
was smaller.
2 In fact, this contrast between A and X/Y(A) was significant in B-learners, but it was not
replicated in two subsequent studies (see Figures 4 and 5) and so can be ignored as a
false positive. In addition, in B-learners, the bias for B over X/Y(B) was significantly
greater than the bias for A over X/Y(A), indicating that B-learners predominately showed
an attentional bias for B.
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Figure 2: In discrimination training, a fixation cross was followed by a
pair of stimuli for 3 seconds during which attention was measured with
an eye tracker. Participants (smokers) then reported their expectancy
(E) of the tobacco win outcome by pressing a number key from 1-10.
Finally, participants could perform an instrumental tobacco seeking
response (R - a space bar press), which yielded a tobacco win
outcome (O – “you win ¼ of a cigarette”) in AX+ and AY+ trials, or an
equivalent tobacco lose outcome (“you lose ¼ of a cigarette”) in BX-
and BY- trials. Non responding produced no outcome. The schedule
included four randomly intermixed trial types: AX+, AY+, BX-, BY-,
which established stimulus A as a predictor of wins (S+), stimulus B
as a predictor of equivalent losses (S-), and stimuli X and Y as
redundant contextual cues that were common to both rewarded and
unrewarded trials. To gain net reward, participants had to learn to
perform the instrumental response more frequently in AX+ and AY+
trials (labelled A+ trials for short), than in BX- and BY- trials (labelled
B- trials for short), so that wins outweighed losses. Analysis examined
dwell time to the individual stimuli within the four trial types: stimulus
A+, B- and the concurrently presented contextual stimuli X/Y in A
trials (labelled X/Y(A)) and in B trials (labelled X/Y(B)). In addition,
reward expectancy and percent trials with an instrumental response
were compared across A+ trials and B- trials. The four stimuli shown
were balanced in the role of A, B, X and Y.
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Figure 3. Left column: Reward expectancy (1-10 scale) on A+ trials (that is, AX+ and AY+ trials)
and B- trials (that is, BX- and BY- trials). Middle column: Discrimination (% trials with an
instrumental response) between A+ trials and B- trials. Right column: Dwell time (natural
logmsec) to stimulus A and B as well as the concurrently presented contextual cues X/Y in A and B
trials (labelled X/Y(A) and X/Y(B), respectively). Only contingency aware participants, indexed by
a significant difference in reward expectancies between A+ and B- trials in block 5, are included.
Moreover, aware participants were split according to whether post experimental questioning
indicated that they had learned the A=win rule (top row), the B=lose rule (middle row), or both
rules (bottom row). Attention, but not expectancy or instrumental discrimination, was influenced
by which rule participants used.
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Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the attentional data in Figure 3, is A-learners’
larger bias for A over X/Y(A) than B-learners’ bias for B over X/Y(B), despite the fact
that these two groups were ostensibly using A and B, respectively, to control their
expectancy and instrumental choice equally. There are two differences in the information
conveyed by stimulus A and B for these two groups. For A-learners, stimulus A signalled
that the instrumental response should be performed to obtain reward, whereas for B-
learners, stimulus B signalled that the instrumental response should be withheld to avoid
equivalent loss. Thus, these cues have different connections to action
initiation/withholding, and are associated with outcomes with different biological value,
win/loss. The question, therefore, is whether the attentional biases seen in Figure 3 can
be explained by looking-for-action, or, looking-for-liking.
Three observations challenge the simple link between attention and action. First, as we
have noted, why was the preference for A in A-learners statistically significantly bigger
than the bias for B in B-learners, when the two groups were ostensibly using these
respective cues to control their performance equally? Second, why did A&B-learners
show attentional selection of A but not B when they knew the relevance both cues had
for behaviour? Finally, why did the preference for A in A-learners and A&B-learners
increase with training, tracing the control by this stimulus over instrumental action,
whereas the bias for B in B-learners remained relatively constant over blocks, failing to
trace the control this stimulus exerted over instrumental action?
The alternative proposal is that attention was maintained to the extent that the stimuli
had acquired reward value (i.e. in participants who were aware of the stimulus-reward
contingency). This explains the large bias for A over X/Y(A) in A and A&B learners,
compared to the small bias for B over X/Y(B) in B-learners (we’ll leave aside other subtle
differences in the data until later).
This idea that attention is commanded by the acquired reward value of cues, was
substantiated by a subsequent modification to the design in which one key press was
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rewarded with tobacco in AX+ and AY+ trials, whereas a second key press was rewarded
with a financially equivalent amount of money in BX+ and BY+ trials (Hogarth et al.,
2007, Experiment 2). Of the 11 aware participants (out of 16) in this study, five were
A=tobacco-learners and six were B=money-learners (there were no A&B learners). The
results are shown in Figure 4. A-learners attended to A over the context, but not B,
whereas B-learners showed the converse attentional bias. This finding confirms that
there is a strong relationship between predictive learning and selective attention. Most
critically, however, B-learners showed a larger bias for B over X/Y(B) compared to B-
learners in Figure 3, suggesting that this bias was enhanced as a result of B being
associated with a rewarding outcome.
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Figure 4: Outcome expectancy (1=money, 10=tobacco) and instrumental discrimination (% trials
with a tobacco rather than a money response) in Atobacco vs. Bmoney trials, plus, dwell time
(natural logmsec) to stimulus A and B relative to the concurrently presented contextual cues X/Y.
Aware participants were split by whether they learned the A=tobacco or B=money rule (no one
learned both rules). Again, selective attention was dependent upon which rule was acquired.
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If the attentional biases analysed so far reflect looking for liking, rather than looking for
action, we should be able to dissociate this attentional bias from the control that stimuli
exert over expectancy and instrumental performance. To test this proposal, we added a
test phase to one of the replications included in Figure 3, which attempted to abolish the
dwell time bias. To this end, we required participants to count visual targets that
appeared amongst a rapidly alternating sequence of distracters in the centre of the
screen, simultaneously during the 3-sec period of stimulus presentation, to force
attention to remain in the centre rather than saccade to the peripheral location of the
CSs (see; Hogarth et al., 2008b for details). Figure 5 shows the results from blocks of
this test phase that did and did not include this secondary task (the measures are flat
because they had reached asymptote by the final blocks of training). The first thing to
note is that the pattern of bias seen in training continued in testing in the normal
condition (without the secondary task). That is, A-learners showed a dwell time bias for
A over X/Y(A), and no bias for B over X/Y(B), whereas B-learners showed the converse
pattern – a bias for B over X/Y(B) and no bias for A over X/Y(A). Second, and most
importantly, the inclusion of the secondary task was highly effective at abolishing
attention to the peripherally located discriminative stimuli. In fact, examination of
fixation count data (not shown) indicated that the discriminative stimuli were fixated in
only 10% of secondary task trials. Nevertheless, despite this abolition of focal attention
to stimuli, expectancy and instrumental discrimination remained fully intact in these
trials. These data indicated that the dwell time biases to stimuli were unnecessary for
stimuli to exert control over expectancy and instrumental performance. Indeed, these
data indicate that covert detection of discriminative stimuli in the periphery of the visual
field is sufficient for these stimuli to exert the same degree of control over expectancy
and instrumental behaviour as when they command the maintenance of overt focal
attention. Therefore, the overt maintenance of attention appears to be superfluous to
behavioural control, whereas simple covert detection of stimuli appears to be sufficient
for behavioural control (see; de Haan et al., 2008) for further information on the
distinction between overt and covert attention).
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Figure 5: The dual task method. Reward expectancy (1-10 scale) and instrumental discrimination
(% trials with an instrumental response) between A+ and B- trials, plus, dwell time (natural
logmsec) to stimulus A and B relative to the concurrently presented contextual cues X/Y. Aware
participants were split according to whether they learned the A=win or B=lose rule. The results
show that introducing the secondary task abolished the attentional bias for stimulus A and B in A-
and B-learners, respectively, without effecting the control these stimuli exerted over expectancy
and instrumental discrimination. Thus, these attentional biases were superfluous to behavioural
control.
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In a follow up study, we explored whether the 3-seconds of “dead time” during which
stimuli were presented, and no action could be undertaken (see Figure 2), allowed the
superfluous attentional biases controlled by reward value to be expressed (Hogarth et
al., 2009). The inspiration for this study came from Premack and Collier (1966), who
allowed participants to control the duration of stimulus presentation by holding down a
key – known as an observing response in the operant literature (Wyckoff, 1952) – in a
discrimination procedure not dissimilar to our own. Their critical finding was that
observing times for stimuli paired with reward declined with training, which would be
expected if attention was deployed efficiently to control instrumental behaviour, rather
then increased, as might be expected if attention was controlled by the acquired reward
value of cues.
The implication of Premack and Collier's (1966) finding was that the opportunity for
immediate action caused participants to dispense with the overt maintenance of
attention to reward cues, and instead, to employ a more economic form of stimulus
detection, sufficient for expectancy and instrumental choice, but no more. To test this
idea, we ran second a group alongside one of the replications included in Figure 3, but
rather than present stimuli for a fixed 3-sec period, this group could control stimulus
duration by holding down a key using a method akin to Premack and Collier (1966).
The results from the observing response group are shown in Figure 6 and indicate that
A-learners and B-learners acquired no dwell time bias for stimulus A and B, respectively,
in contrast to when stimulus presentation was fixed (Figure 3). Nevertheless, the control
exerted by these cues over expectancy and instrumental discrimination performance was
equivalent regardless of whether or not the dwell time bias was expressed, again
confirming that these dwell time biases played no role in expectancy or behavioural
control.
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Figure 6: The observing response method. Reward expectancy (1-10 scale) and instrumental
discrimination (% trials with an instrumental response) between A+ and B- trials, plus, dwell time
(natural logmsec) to stimulus A and B relative to the concurrently presented contextual cues X/Y.
Aware participants are split according to whether they learned the A=win or B=lose rule. The
results show that providing control over stimulus duration abolished the attentional bias for
stimulus A and B in A- and B-learners, respectively, yet stimulus control of expectancy and
instrumental performance remained unaffected.
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Summary- Untangling arousal and valence
The foregoing data support Figure 1 in suggesting that the detection and maintenance of
attention to conditioned stimuli are determined by the arousal and valence of the
predicted outcome, respectively. With respect to the early detection of the CSs, our data
clearly indicate that efficient detection, but not attentional maintenance, plays a role in
the behavioural control exerted by these stimuli. In fact, in Hogarth et al., (2008b)
stimuli A and B were able to control expectancy and instrumental choice without being
foveated on 90% of trials, indicating that parafoveal detection of these stimuli was
sufficient for them to exert behavioural control. We might claim that such parafoveal
detection was equal for the appetitive stimulus A and the aversive stimulus B, as
predicted by the left column of Figure 1, from the fact that these cues controlled
expectancy and instrumental choice equally in A- and B-learners. This conclusion fits
with recent data showing that early detection of cues respects the arousal of those cues
rather than their valence (Brosch et al., 2008, Vogt et al., 2008). However, the specific
claim that early detection is enhanced for CSs that predict an arousing outcome is at
present indirect because we currently have no way of measuring the enhancement of
detection with the eye tracker3.
The maintenance of attention to CSs, by contrast, was evidently determined by the
valence of the predicted outcome, as anticipated by the middle column of Figure 1. The
3 One might think that the latency of the first fixation to stimulus A and B might be faster than for
the contextual cues X/Y, reflecting the enhancement of early detection of cues associated with
arousing outcomes. Unfortunately, however, we have found that first fixation latency was not
reliably different between these cues. This measure may have been insensitive because the
location of the predictive and contextual cues was randomised across trials. In the future, we may
seek to measure the enhancement of early detection directly by fixing the location of stimuli, or by
including alternative measures such as signal detection (Engelmann and Pessoa 2007), EEG
(Brosch et al. 2008), attentional blink (Livesey et al. 2009) or spatial cueing effects (Vogt et al
2008). It remains to be seen how these alternative measures might be integrated into the
conditioning procedure.
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key finding supporting this claim was that dwell time biases were greater for the
appetitive stimulus A in A-learners than for the aversive stimulus B in B-learners, despite
the fact that the two cues were equally relevant for behaviour control in the two groups.
These data suggest that the dwell time bias was enhanced by the prediction of the win
outcome in stimulus A, compared to the prediction of the lose outcome in stimulus B.
Thus, the valence of the predicted outcome appeared to determine the maintenance of
attention to the CS (note that this conclusion relies on the assumption that the win and
the lose outcome were equally subjectively arousing). The second key finding was that
the dwell time bias for stimulus A was unnecessary for this stimulus to control
expectancy and instrumental choice, consistent with the claim that this bias is linked to
affective appraisal rather than behaviour control. It is important to note that although
the dwell time bias for B was reduced compared to A, there was no evidence of
attentional avoidance of B. Presumably, the lose outcome was not sufficiently aversive to
drive avoidance, but this remains to be clarified.
The interplay of these two systems may explain the total pattern of results shown in
Figure 3. According to this account, A-learners efficiently detected stimulus A to control
instrumental choice, and subsequently, maintained gaze on stimulus A because of its
acquired appetitive value (enabled because attention is not demanded elsewhere). These
two forms of selection added together, creating a large dwell time bias for stimulus A
relative to X/Y(A). By contrast, we propose that A&B-learners had a less specific search
image for stimulus A because they also used B, or the absence of A or B, as the critical
information to control instrumental choice (Plaisted and Mackintosh, 1995).
Consequently, this weaker detection of A summed with the maintained bias for A, driven
by the reward association, to yield a smaller overall dwell time bias for A over X/Y(A)
compared to A-learners. Finally, we suggest that B-learners detected stimulus B to
control instrumental choice, but did not maintain attention to this stimulus because it
had no reward association. Instead, the initial detection carried over to generate a small
dwell time bias compared to X/Y(B) because attention did not disengage to meet other
Page 25 23/11/2009
25
demands (Posner et al., 1980) and the aversive properties of the cue were insufficient to
drive clear attentional avoidance.
Looking-for-learning
The foregoing analysis claims that a CS paired with an aversive outcome should not
command a substantive dwell time bias. However, this proposal is, at first sight,
contradicted by one of our published studies (Hogarth et al., 2006a). In this study, the
AX+, AY+, BX-, BY- design was used (outlined in Figure 2), but instead of reward,
stimulus A signalled that a 97 dB aversive, startling white noise outcome would occur
subsequently with 100% probability, and that an instrumental avoidance response would
cancel this outcome with a 50% probability (to ensure that an A-noise contingency would
be in force even if participants performed the avoidance response in every trial). By
contrast, stimulus B signalled the absence of the aversive noise, and stimuli X/Y were
contextual cues as before. This early method did not include the within-trial expectancy
question, and consequently, a substantially smaller proportion of the sample became
aware of the stimulus-outcome contingencies (5 out of 16), as indexed by post-
experimental questioning, which also suggested that all five aware participants were A&B
learners. The important finding shown in Figure 7, was that these aware participants
acquired a substantive dwell time bias for stimulus A over X/Y(A), but not for B over
X/Y(B). At first sight, these data suggest that the aversive S+ acquired a maintained
attentional bias, contradicting our claim that this bias should be selective to appetitive
cues.
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Figure 7: Aversive conditioning study. Avoidance response discrimination (% trials with the
avoidance response) between A+ and B- trials, plus, dwell time (natural logmsec) to stimulus A
and B relative to the concurrently presented contextual cues X/Y. The five contingency aware
participants included were all A&B-learners.
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An alternative explanation of Figure 7, is that dwell time bias for stimulus A was not
driven by the prediction of an arousing outcome, but by the uncertainty engaged by the
this stimulus as a result of its partial contingency with the noise outcome and/or
effectiveness of the avoidance response. To test this claim, we ran a modified design
based upon Figure 2, inspired by Kaye and Pearce (1984), in which the stimulus pairs
AX+, BX+/- and CX-, were followed by the aversive noise outcome with a probability of
100%, 50% and 0%, respectively (Hogarth et al., 2008a). There was no instrumental
avoidance response, so participants’ only task in the procedure was to accurately report
the Pavlovian contingencies in the within-trials expectancy question, “how likely is the
loud noise”, on a 1-10 scale. The top row of Figure 8 shows the expectancy reports of
the 11 aware participants (out of 16) who showed a significant difference in their
expectancy reports in the final block of training, in the direction of A>B>C, and most
importantly, the dwell times for the four stimuli: A, B, C versus the concurrently
presented contextual stimulus X.
The key finding was that the unreliable predictor stimulus B commanded a greater dwell
time bias relative to the contextual cue X(B), than did A vs. X(A) and C vs. X(C). Thus,
the stimulus that was associated with the greatest predictive uncertainty commanded
the greatest dwell time bias. Moreover, although A and C commanded greater dwell than
the contextual cue X, these biases were of equivalent magnitude, indicating that the
reliable aversive predictor stimulus A commanded no greater bias than the non-predictor
stimulus C. This finding confirms our claim that the prediction of an aversive outcome
does not enhance the dwell time bias, in contrast to our earlier finding that the
prediction of an appetitive outcome does. The reason why stimulus A and C commanded
a greater dwell time than stimulus X may simply have been because X was presented in
every trial, meaning that stimuli A and C had greater novelty and lower frequency than
X. The implication of these findings is that the bias for stimulus A in Figure 6 was
determined by the predictive uncertainty associated with this stimulus rather than the
prediction of an arousing (aversive) outcome.
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The bottom row of Figure 8 shows a replication of the design in which we replaced the
aversive startling noise outcome with a neutral 50 dB tone, to determine whether the
loss of dwell time bias for A (compared to B) was driven by attentional avoidance. The
important finding was that the original effects seen in the top row were replicated with
the neutral outcome, confirming that the attentional effects were determined by the
differential uncertainty associated with each stimulus, rather than any affective value
acquired through association with the aversive outcome.
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Figure 8: Two studies exploring the maintenance of attention to stimuli with differential
relationships to an aversive (top row) and neutral noise outcome (bottom row). Noise expectancy
ratings (1-10 scale) and dwell times (natural logmsec) to a full, partial and non-predictor stimulus
A, B and C, respectively, relative to a concurrently presented contextual cue X. The key result was
that the dwell time bias was greatest for the partial predictor stimulus B which was associated
with the greatest uncertainty, with both the aversive and neutral outcome.
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Summary - Untangling arousal, valence and uncertainty
Our data suggest that conditioned stimuli command the three forms of attentional
selection (see Figure 1). Conditioned stimuli appear to command efficient detection to
the extent that they are associated with an arousing outcome (irrespective of valence),
and command the maintenance of overt attention to the extent that they are associated
with an appetitive outcome. In addition to this, conditioned stimuli also appear to
command the maintenance of overt attention to the extent that they convey uncertainty
about the probability of an outcome, irrespective of whether the outcome is aversive or
neutral. We propose that these three forms of attentional selection play a role in action
selection, affective state and learning, respectively.
There are several ways one might develop this work to further isolate the three
attentional systems. First, further contrasts are needed of the nine conditions outlined in
Figure 1. One gap in our analysis, for example, is that we have not assessed uncertainty
effects for CSs paired with an appetitive outcome. Second, there is need to discover a
measure of attention that is sensitive to the enhancement of early detection as distinct
from the maintenance of attention measured by dwell time. For this purpose, we have
hinted at signal detection (Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007), EEG (Brosch et al., 2008),
attentional blink (Livesey et al., 2009) or spatial cueing (Vogt et al., 2008), but the
incorporation of these measures into the current procedures remains to be explored.
Third, a broader range of aversive outcomes might be tested, to determine the
conditions under which attentional avoidance is generated. Forth, closer analysis is
required of the time course of stimulus viewing, to identify the point at which looking-
for-action is superseded by looking-for-liking or looking-for-learning. Finally, direct
contrasts might be made of discriminative instrumental versus Pavlovian procedures,
which are otherwise yoked for cue-outcome frequency (see; Rescorla, 1994), to assess
attentional performance when instrumental action is and is not possible. The ultimate
objective of this program of work would be to isolate and dissociate the three attentional
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systems for application to brain imaging to contribute to a neuropsychological model of
attention.
Once the appropriate parameters are established to isolate the three attentional
systems, one could more clearly reassess their proposed differential role in action
selection, affective state and learning. For instance, one might assess whether enhanced
detection for arousing cues predicts differential behavioural control exerted by these
stimuli in tests of cue competition (De Houwer and Beckers, 2002, Kruschke et al.,
2005). Further, one might test whether dwell time to appetitive cues, or avoidance of
aversive cues is modulated by mood induction, individual affective state (Beevers and
Carver, 2003, Tamir and Robinson, 2007), or post-conditioning revaluation/devaluation
of the incentive value of the outcome (Holland and Straub, 1979, Hutcheson et al.,
2001), to explore the link between attentional maintenance and affect. Finally, one
might examine whether dwell time associated with uncertainty predicts the associability
of stimuli in tests of learning (Wilson et al., 1992, Holland and Gallagher, 2006),
although this work would have to reconcile apparent contradictory evidence that learning
is sometimes superior for reliable predictors (see; Le Pelley, 2004, Le Pelley and
McLaren, 2003). In all, this work should clarify the role of the three attentional systems
in action, affect and learning.
The neural basis of attention in associative learning
One final issue concerns the neural substrates of the three attentional systems. Perhaps
the most informative work addressing this issue has come from the animal behavioural
neuroscience lab of Peter Holland, and this topic is discussed extensively in a separate
chapter. Our aim is not to compete with this chapter, but rather, to highlight a small set
of exemplary studies which appear to have isolated one of the three attentional systems
in a way reminiscent of our human studies. Our purpose in highlighting the relationship
between these human and animal studies is to hint at what shape a translational
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program of research might take to contribute to a neuropsychological theory of attention
in associative learning.
Holland and colleagues recently identified a form of CS orienting that plays no role in the
control that CS exert over instrumental behaviour (Groshek et al., 2005, McDannald et
al., 2004), reminiscent of the studies outlined in Figures 5 and 6, where abolition of the
dwell time bias to the CS had no impact on CS control of expectancy and instrumental
performance. In these animal studies, rats learned that a 10-sec external light or noise
CS was followed immediately by the availability of food in a feeding tray. In parallel with
our results, rats developed an attentional bias for the conditioned stimuli, indexed by a
higher frequency of orientation of the eyes or ears towards that stimulus in the early
portion of its presentation, while learning to approach the food tray in response to the
CS in anticipation of food delivery, in the latter portion of its presentation. The fact that
attentional orientation was not necessary for reward seeking by the rats was
demonstrated by deactivation of the central nucleus of the amygdala, which abolished
the attentional bias for the CS, but left intact the ability of the CS to elicit food seeking.
El-Amamy and Holland (2007) recently confirmed this dissociation between the
attentional bias and instrumental performance in a Pavlovian to instrumental transfer
design.
These data have a striking similarity to our own (Figures 3, 5 and 6), in that the bias for
the CS and its control of reward seeking emerged in parallel across conditioning, yet the
abolition of the attentional bias had no impact on CS control of behaviour. The question,
therefore, is what caused a form of attentional bias to develop that played no functional
role in behaviour? We believe that this bias reflected the looking-for-liking system, which
was recruited by the prediction of the reward outcome evoked by the CS, and enabled by
the fact that the CS was presented for a 10-sec period of dead time during which
instrumental responding was ineffective (the implication being, that if the CS and food
availability were simultaneous, as in Figure 6, the looking-for-action system – efficient
detection – would have been unmasked in mediating instrumental responding). If this
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assertion is true, then by implication, the central nucleus of the amygdala is one
component of the neural circuit underlying the looking-for-liking system.
Another recent experiment from Holland’s lab (Maddux et al., 2007) dissociated the
substrates underlying the looking-for-action and looking-for-learning systems. In this
study, performance of the five choice serial reaction time task was used to index the role
of attention in guiding behavioural choice, whereas the ability of surprise (prediction
error) to enhance learning was used to index the role of attention in facilitating
contingency learning. This study found that lesions of the cholinergic projection from the
substantiate innominata/nucleus basalis magnocellularis (SI/nBM) to the medial
prefrontal cortex interfered with the role of attention in guiding behavioural choice but
not in the enhancement of learning. By contrast, lesions to the cholinergic projection to
the posterior parietal cortex had the converse effect - interfering with the role of
attention in learning but not in behavioural control. Finally, lesions of the central nucleus
of the amygdala, which is linked to the SI/nBM, interfered with both forms of attention.
Collectively, therefore, the foregoing studies from Holland’s lab support the notion that
although the circuits underlying looking for action, liking and learning are commonly
routed through the central nucleus of the amygdala, they diverge thereafter to separate
cortical projections through the SI/nBM.
Our human procedures could in the future contribute to a neuropsychological theory of
attention in associative learning by first optimising the parameters needed to
behaviourally isolate the three attentional systems, as described earlier, and then
transferring these methods into an MRI scanner, to help elucidate the full extent of the
circuits underlying each attentional system (see; Armony and Dolan, 2002). The animal
work could then pinpoint these neuroanatomical substrates beyond the resolution of the
scanner.
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